Nuclear Incidents on Indian Reservations: Who Has Jurisdiction? Tribal Court Exhaustion Versus the Price-Anderson Act by Kuntz, James W.
American Indian Law Review
Volume 21 | Number 1
1-1-1997
Nuclear Incidents on Indian Reservations: Who
Has Jurisdiction? Tribal Court Exhaustion Versus
the Price-Anderson Act
James W. Kuntz
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
James W. Kuntz, Nuclear Incidents on Indian Reservations: Who Has Jurisdiction? Tribal Court Exhaustion Versus the Price-Anderson Act,
21 Am. Indian L. Rev. 103 (1997),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol21/iss1/4
NUCLEAR INCIDENTS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS:
WHO HAS JURISDICTION? TRIBAL COURT
EXHAUSTION VERSUS THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT
James W. Kuntz*
Introduction
While the "Cold War" nuclear threat may be over, litigation in the arena of
nuclear-related incidents is heating up. Surprisingly, Native Americans may
find themselves intimately involved in this litigation in the near future. This is
because much of Native American lands contain facilities that mine and
produce uranium for the United States' nuclear energy programs.
In the wake of these uranium production facilities are five thousand Native
American employees' and thousands of other Indian families that live
dangerously close to the facilities.2 William Rowe, former Deputy Assistant
Administrator for Radiation Programs of the Environmental Protection Agency,
testified in congressional hearings that radon gas is so highly carcinogenic that
radioactive levels at uranium mill sites would approximately double the lung
cancer rate for nearby residents.' While it may take many years for
unsuspecting Native Americans and their families to recognize they have been
injured, it is only a matter of time before some seek compensation for their
injuries in court.
But which court do Native Americans turn to for help? Tribal court? State
court? Federal court? One would suspect Indians could go to their own
reservation tribal court to seek recompense for their injuries. Under the tribal
court exhaustion doctrine, the tribal court should have jurisdiction over the
action because the injury occurred to an Indian on reservation land The only
*Associate, Carrington, Coleman, Sloman & Blumenthal, Dallas, Tex. J.D., 1996, University
of Nebraska College of Law; B.A., 1982, Furman University. The author worked on this issue
as a Summer Associate at Lewis and Roca, Phoenix, Arizona. (Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Kee Tom
Farley, No. Civ. 95-0438 MV (D.N.M. filed May 25, 1995) (Motion for Preliminary Injunction)
(Motion denied). The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not to be deemed
that of either party to the action.
Second-place winner, 1995-96 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. Meyers, Uranium Industry Labor Market Analysis, San Juan Basin Regional Uranium
Study, Working Paper No. 10, at 7 (May 1, 1978).
2. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission found radionuclide exposure from radon gas and
particulates increased by as much as sixiy percent for people living within a fifty mile radius of
a uranium mill. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, Draft Environmental Impact Statement on Uranium
Milling, at 6-47 (Apr. 1979).
3. Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978: Hearings on H.R. 1480 Before the
Subcomm. on Energy and Power, Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 95th Cong. 400 (1978).
4. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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exception to the exhaustion doctrine is when the federal government expressly
precludes tribal court jurisdiction.' Enter the Price-Anderson Act.
Congress enacted the Price-Anderson Act in 1957 to protect the public from
nuclear accidents by mandating regulatory standards for private businesses and
providing compensation for the public in the event of a nuclear incident.6 The
1988 Amendments to the Act give original jurisdiction to federal courts and
provide for an absolute right of removal from a state court to the federal
district court where the nuclear incident takes place.7 Noticeably absent from
the entire Act is any express mention of tribal courts or tribal court jurisdiction.
Without an express preclusion, one would believe that Indians could bring
Price-Anderson claims to their tribal court without contention. However, as is
the case with many statutory readings, the law is not as clear as it first appears.
There are signs Congress intended there to be an express prohibition against
tribal court jurisdiction within the Price-Anderson Act.
The purpose of this article is to explore jurisdictional authority over nuclear-
related incidents that take place on Indian land. This article will first discuss
the historical aspects of the Price-Anderson Act, including a look at the
pertinent jurisdictional sections of the Act. Next, the article will consider the
Native American sovereignty perspective. The Native American sovereignty
perspective is that tribal court exhaustion applies to nuclear incidents that take
placed on reservation land because there is no express jurisdictional prohibition
stated within the Price-Anderson Act. The article will then consider the Price-
Anderson perspective. Legislative history, case law, and statutory interpretation
of Price-Anderson will be reviewed to demonstrate Congress may have
intended to create an express tribal court jurisdictional prohibition.
Finally, the article will consider the future implications of the Price-
Anderson Act on tribal court jurisdiction. In this author's opinion, the Price-
Anderson Act, as written today, only ensures nuclear-related incidents are
consolidated and decided in a single forum - the Act does not preclude tribal
court jurisdiction. However, a wise tribal court may defer jurisdiction to federal
court because of the complexity of nuclear regulatory litigation and the
potential problems associated with presiding over claims from numerous
federal, state, and possibly other Native American tribal jurisdictions.
Moreover, the absence of any language concerning tribal court jurisdiction
within the Price-Anderson Act may be a legislative oversight. Consequently,
a tribal court accepting jurisdiction over a Price-Anderson claim may lose
administration over the complaint through a subsequent amendment to the Act
by Congress.
5. Id. at 18.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994).
7. Id. § 2210(n)(2).
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History of the Price-Anderson Act
Congress initiated regulation of the nuclear power industry with the
enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. While that statute reflected
Congress' determination that the nuclear power industry would be a government
monopoly, Congress later concluded that it would be in the national interest to
permit private sector involvement in the industry under a system of federal
licensing and regulation. This policy decision was implemented in the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954.' However, the private actors entering the nuclear power
industry were still required to confront the risks associated with potentially
devastating liability which might be imposed in the event of a major nuclear
accident. "[W]hile repeatedly stressing that the risk of a major nuclear accident
was extremely remote, spokesmen for the private sector informed Congress that
they would be forced to withdraw from the field if their liability were not
limited by appropriate legislation."9
Congress responded in 1957 by passing the Price-Anderson Act." The Act
had the dual purpose of "protect[ing] the public and . . . encourag[ing] the
development of the atomic energy industry."' The Act contained three central
elements. First, the Act set a ceiling on the aggregate liability that could be
imposed upon those engaged in the use and handling of radioactive material
"either through contract with the Federal Government or under a license issued
by the Federal Government for the private development of such activities."'"
The second important feature of the Act involved the "channeling of liability."
Under this provision, any entity exposed to potential liability for activity
resulting in a nuclear incident, 3 even if it was not a direct participant in the
activity, was entitled to indemnification. Finally, the Price-Anderson Act
established that all public liability claims above the amount of required public
insurance protection "would be indemnified by the Federal Government, up to
the aggregate amount on liability.'
4
In 1966, prior to the scheduled expiration of the Price-Anderson Act, the
liability limitation portions of the Act were extended for an additional ten years
8. Id. §§ 2211-2281.
9. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 64 (1978).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994).
11. Id. § 2012(i).
12. S. REP. No. 100-218 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1476, 1477.
13. A nuclear incident is defined as
any occurrence... within the United States causing, within or outside the United
States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property,
or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic,
explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct
material ....
42 U.S.C. § 2014(q) (1994).
14. S. REP. No. 100-218, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1477.
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and a new provision was added which required that those indemnified waive
the defenses of negligence, contributory negligence, charitable or governmental
immunity, and assumption of risk in the event of an action arising from the
result of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence.15 The 1966 amendments also
provided for the transfer of all claims arising out of an extraordinary nuclear
occurrence to a federal district court.1 6 These provisions grew out of
congressional concern that state tort law dealing with liability for nuclear
incidents was generally unsettled and some way of ensuring a common
standard of responsibility for all jurisdictions was needed.'7
In 1975, Congress amended the Price-Anderson Act a second time. These
amendments extended the Act's coverage and made certain liability limitation
adjustments. Provision was also made to phase out the federal indemnity
portion of the Price-Anderson scheme.
In 1988, Congress amended the Price-Anderson Act for a third time,
enacting the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988. The decision to amend
and extend the Price-Anderson Act grew out of the congressional conclusion
that:
The Price Anderson system, including the waiver of defenses
provisions, the omnibus coverage, and the predetermined sources
of funding, provides persons seeking compensation for injuries as
a result of a nuclear incident with significant advantages over the
procedures and standards for recovery that might otherwise be
applicable under State tort law. The Act also provides a
mechanism whereby the federal government can continue to
encourage private sector participation in the beneficial uses of
nuclear materials."9
The Amendments Act included an expansion of the reach of section 2210(n)(2)
to provide for removal of, and original federal jurisdiction over, claims arising
from any "nuclear incident."'9 Section 2210(n)(2) was amended to read as
follows:
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1994). An extraordinary nuclear occurrence is defined as
any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct
material from its intended place of confinement in amounts offsite, or causing
radiation levels offsite, which the .. .Commission . .. determines to be
substantial, and which the... Commission ... determines has resulted or will
probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite.
Id. § 2014(j).
16. Id. § 2210(n)(2).
17. A waiver of defenses approach was thought to be preferable since it entailed less
interference with state tort law than would the enactment of a federal statute prescribing strict
liability. See S. REP. No. 89-1605 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3201.
18. S. REP. No. 100-218, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1479.
19. See supra note 13.
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With respect to any public liability action arising out of or
resulting from a nuclear incident, the United States district court in
the district where the nuclear incident takes place, or in the case of
a nuclear incident taking place outside the United States, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall
have original jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of any
party or the amount in controversy. Upon motion of the defendant
or of the Commission or the Secretary, as appropriate, any such
action pending in any State court (including any such action
pending on ... [the date of the enactment of the Price-Anderson
Amendments Act of 1988]) or United States district court shall be
removed or transferred to the United States district court having
venue under this subsection."
It is the language and the legislative history of this section which generates the
questions concerning tribal court jurisdiction over Price-Anderson claims.
Public Liability
Section 2014(hh) of the Price-Anderson Act defines a public liability action
as "any suit asserting public liability.' '1  Under the terms of the 1988
Amendments Act, the "public liability action" encompasses "any legal liability"
of any person who may be liable because of a nuclear incident.' Given the
breadth of this definition, the consequences of a determination that a particular
plaintiff has failed to state a public liability claim potentially compensable
under the Price-Anderson Act is that he has no claim at all.
After the Amendments Act, no state cause of action based upon
public liability exists. A claim growing out of any nuclear incident
is compensable under the terms of the Amendments Act or it is not
compensable at all. Any conceivable state tort action which might
remain available to a plaintiff following the determination that his
claim could not qualify as a public liability action, would not be
based on 'any legal liability' of 'any person who may be liable on
account of a nuclear incident.' It would be some other species of
tort altogether, and the fact that the state courts might recognize
such a tort has no relevance to the Price-Anderson scheme z
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (1994).
21. Id. § 2014(hh). Public liability is a concept which was not changed by the 1988
Amendments Act. Public liability was defined in the original Price-Anderson Act as "any legal
liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary evacuation ...." Id.
§ 2014(w).
22. Id. § 2014(w).
23. In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. I, 940 F.2d 832, 854-55 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 906 (1992) (emphasis added) (TMI II).
No. 1]
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Consequently, there can be no action for injuries caused by a nuclear incident
separate and apart from the federal public liability action created by the 1988
Amendments to the Price-Anderson Act. Thus, all claims against a party
concerning a nuclear incident fall under the auspices of the Price-Anderson Act
and must be tried according to the federal statute.2
Jurisdiction Over Nuclear Incidents
Native American Sovereignty Perspective
The issue as to whether a Native American tribal court has jurisdiction to
adjudicate a lawsuit involving injuries to Indians arising from a nuclear incident
that takes place on Indian territory has been overlooked since the Price-
Anderson Act was enacted in 1957. This is a major oversight considering the
highest concentration of uranium mining and milling activity occurs on Indian
reservations in the San Juan River Basin of northern New Mexico and southern
Colorado' Potential claims of uranium contamination and subsequent cancer
are just now beginning to surface in Native American families.' Each of
24. Congress recognized that Article III of the Constitution limited the types of cases that
federal courts created under the Article may hear. For this reason, House Bill 1414 expressly
states that any suit asserting public liability shall be deemed to be an action under the Price-
Anderson Act, thereby making suits asserting public liability "[c]ases... arising under ... the
laws of the United States" within the meaning of Article Ill. Rather than design a new body of
substantive rules for decision in nuclear incident actions, the bill provides the substantive rules
for decision shall be derived from the law of the state in which the nuclear incident occurs unless
such law is inconsistent with the Price-Anderson Act. H.R. REP. NO. 100-104, pt. 1, at 18 (1987).
The constitutionality aspect of the Price-Anderson Act is beyond the scope of this article.
25. Almost half of the area within the basin, the Grants Mineral Belt, lies on lands belonging
to the Navajo Nation, Laguna Pueblo, Acoma Pueblo, and Canoncito Pueblo. Uranium production
on Indian lands in the Grants Mineral Belt and elsewhere in New Mexico account for nearly fifty
percent cf the total uranium oxide mined in the United States since 1977. The leased Navajo
Nation land account for fifteen percent of the mineral belt contributions and the bulk of the
uranium oxide production. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, SOUTHWEST REGION, U.S. DEPtT OF THE
INTERIOR, STATUS REPORT. URANIUM DEV. ON FED. AND INDIAN LANDS, NORTHWEST N.M.
AREA 1 (1976).
26. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Kee Tom Farley, No. Civ. 95-0438 MV (D.N.M. filed May
25, 1995) (Motion for Preliminary Injunction) (Motion denied). There are uranium mills which
operate cn Indian country but not on a reservation. Title 18 U.S.C. § 1151 explicitly includes
certain off-reservation lands as Indian country. The United States Code defines "Indian country"
as:
(a) [aIll land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of
the United States Government... (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States .... and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to
which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the
same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). Therefore, even if an issue arises outside the reservation, but still on
Indian country, it can arguably be pursued in the tribal court prior to being considered by the
federal courts due to the tribal court exhaustion doctrine.
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these claims would assert public liability and therefore would need to be
brought under the Price-Anderson Act.'
Tribal Court Exhaustion Doctrine
According to federal law, tribal courts are presumed to have jurisdiction for
injuries to Indians occurring on the reservation, and such jurisdiction is retained
until Congress expressly states otherwise. In National Farmers Union
Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,' the United States Supreme Court
established what is now commonly referred to as the "tribal exhaustion
doctrine.""0 In National Farmers, the Crow Tribal Court entered a default
judgment against a school district and in favor of a Crow Tribe for injuries
resulting from a motorcycle accident in a school parking lot." The school was
located on the Crow Reservation.32 The school and its insurer subsequently
filed an action in federal court, seeking an injunction against the tribal member
pursuing the claim, arguing that the Crow Tribal Court had no jurisdiction over
non-Indians.33 The Supreme Court held that the federal court had subject
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the school district's motion for injunction
because the issue as to whether or not the tribal court had jurisdiction over
non-Indians was a federal question.'M Nevertheless, the Court held the federal
court should not hear the case because to do so would be an impermissible
infringement upon the sovereignty of the Crow Tribe.35 Specifically, the Court
stated:
Our cases have often recognized that Congress is committed to a
policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination.
That policy favors a rule that will provide the forum whose
jurisdiction is being challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the
factual and legal bases for the challenge. Moreover the orderly
administration of justice in the federal court will be served by
In 1985, the Navajo Tribal Council amended the Navajo Tribal Code (with Resolution CJY-
57-85) to clarify the definition of territorial jurisdiction. This was done in order to bring the
definition of "Navajo Indian country" in line with the federal definition of "Indian Country" found
in case law interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Navajo Indian country is defined as: All land within
the exterior boundaries of the Navajo Indian Reservation or of the Eastern Navajo Agency, all
land within the limits of dependent Navajo Indian communities, all Navajo allotments, and all
other land held in trust for, owned in fee by, or leased by the United States to the Navajo Tribe
or any Band of Navajo Indians. NAvAJO NATION CODE tit. 7, § 254 (Equity 1986).
27. See supra text accompanying note 23.
28. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
29. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
30. Id. at 857.
31. Id. at 847.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 848.
34. Id. at 857.
35. Id. at 856.
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allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before
either the merits or any question concerning appropriate relief is
addressed.O
The Supreme Court went on to hold that "[w]hether the federal action should
be dismissed, or merely held in abeyance pending the development of further
Tribal Court proceedings, is a question that should be addressed in the first
instance by the District Court."3
Similarly, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether the tribal court exhaustion requirement
announced in National Farmers, a federal question case, also applied to cases
in which federal court jurisdiction was predicated on diversity of citizenship.
The Supreme Court held the tribal court exhaustion doctrine applied to
diversity of citizenship cases because '[t]he diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332,
makes no reference to Indians and nothing in the legislative history suggests
any intent to render inoperative the established federal policy promoting tribal
self-government." 9 The Court emphasized that "[t]tribal authority over the
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal
sovereignty. ... 'Because the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty
that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference
from silence ... is that the sovereign power ... remains intact.""eI Thus,
because nothing in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 demonstrated an intent by Congress to
limit tribal jurisdiction, "the federal policy supporting tribal self-government
directs a federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a 'full
opportunity to determine its own jurisdictionY.4'
Courts with jurisdiction in the San Juan River Basin have referred to the
tribal court exhaustion doctrine as an inflexible bar to consideration by the
federal court. In Texaco, Inc. v. Zah,42 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
noted:
When the activity at issue arises on the reservation, these policies
[to promote tribal self-determination] almost always dictate that the
parties exhaust their tribal remedies before resorting to the federal
forum. Thus, we have characterized the tribal exhaustion rule as
'an inflexible bar to consideration of the merits of the petition by
the federal court.'43
36. Id.
37. Id. at 857.
38. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
39. d. at 17.
40. Id. at 18 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14 (1982))
(referring to sovereign power to tax).
41. Id. at 16 (quoting National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857).
42. 5 F.3d 1374 (10th Cir. 1993).
43. 1&d at 1378; see also Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442, 445 (10th Cir. 1991) (requiring a
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Similarly, in United States v. Tsosie," the New Mexico District Court stated,
"When the dispute is a 'reservation affair'.., there is no discretion not to
defer.o"
On the basis of courts' views of the tribal court exhaustion doctrine, one can
assert the only way a tribal court could lose its jurisdiction for injuries to
Indians occurring in Indian country is by Congress expressly stating there is no
tribal court jurisdiction. This is where the Price-Anderson Act fits in. The
Price-Anderson Act arguably preempts the field of nuclear-related injuries.f
Thus the questions become: (1) whether the Price-Anderson Act provides an
express prohibition to tribal court jurisdiction; and (2) whether tribal courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over Price-Anderson claims.
Tribal Court Jurisdictional Prohibition
Principles of Native American sovereignty always begin with the tribal court
maintaining jurisdiction over claims which occur in their country. While the
Price-Anderson Act may determine who can exercise regulatory control over
nuclear licensees, the Act does not determine whether a tribal court is capable
of adjudicating a nuclear incident. A tribal court, just as much as a state court,
has the ability to apply federal law to reach a decision. The Supreme Court in
Iowa Mutual emphatically rejected the argument that tribal courts are somehow
biased or not competent enough to render just decisions." Similarly, in Tsosie,
the district court in the San Juan River Basin jurisdiction stated that "a tribal
court, presumably, is as competent to interpret federal law as it is state law."49
Cases concerning Price-Anderson speak in terms of the federal government's
preemptory right to regulate the nuclear industry.' None of the cases discuss
preemptory rights for jurisdictional matters. For example, in In re Three Mile
Island Litigation Cases Consolidated H (TMI II),"' the court held as a result
of Price-Anderson, "states are precluded from regulating the safety aspects of
nuclear energy,"' and the federal government has "exclusive regulatory
authority."'53 The court went on to hold that although damage actions under
Price-Anderson are governed by state law, state standards of liability were
nevertheless void if they "frustrate[d] the objectives of the federal law."' The
petition to be dismissed when it appears there has been a failure to exhaust all tribal remedies).
44. 849 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.M. 1994).
45. Id. at 772 (quoting Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1408 (9th Cir. 1991)).
46. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 18.
47. See supra notes 21, 24 and accompanying text.
48. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 19.
49. Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. at 773.
50. This includes the issuing of nuclear licenses, imposing operation standards, etc.
51. 940 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1991).
52. Id. at 859 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 240-41 (1984)).
53. Id. (quoting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 254).
54. Id. (quoting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256).
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Price-Anderson Act itself states the "substantive rules for decision in [an action
for damages] shall be derived from the law of the State in which the nuclear
incident involved occurs, unless such law is inconsistent with the provisions of
[the Price-Anderson Act]."'55
In other words, "states are preempted from imposing a non-federal duty in
tort, because any state duty would infringe upon pervasive federal regulation
in the ,field of nuclear safety, and. thus would conflict with federal law."'56
These are choice of law issues which have no bearing on the issue of which
courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate causes of action arising under Price-
Anderson. The Act may preempt the field of nuclear energy and may create
a "new and independent, indeed exclusive, cause of action," but preemption,
in the context of Price-Anderson, only means the tribal court adjudicating the
case must apply federal law.
Concurrent Jurisdiction
Tribal self-government advocates also contend Price-Anderson does not
create exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. When Congress intends to
provide for an exclusively federal forum, it knows how to say so. In the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934," the United States Code expressly states
that "[t]he district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive
jurisdiction ... of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and regulations
thereunder."59 Contrary to this specific language by Congress, Price-
Anderson provides:
With respect to any public liability action arising out of or
resulting from a nuclear incident, the United States district court in
the district where the nuclear incident takes place ... shall have
originaljurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of any party
or the amount in controversy. Upon motion of the defendant or of
the Commission or the Secretary, as appropriate, any such action
pending in any State court.., or United States district court shall
be removed or transferred to the United States district court having
venue under this subsection.'
From the Native American sovereignty perspective, this section of the Price-
Anderson Act completely and unambiguously refutes any contention that
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(hh) (1994).
56. TM II, 940 F.2d at 859 (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comnm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983)).
57. O'Connorv. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1099 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 2711 (1994).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994).
59. Id, § 78aa.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (n)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
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Congress intended for federal courts to be the exclusive forum for adjudicating
actions under the Act.
The Act expressly acknowledges state courts may adjudicate Price-Anderson
cases. The fact such cases are subject to removal does not eliminate the
existence of concurrent state jurisdiction. Moreover, the fact that section 2210
(n)(2) speaks only in terms of state courts cannot be read to mean only state
courts, and not tribal courts, have concurrent jurisdiction. Tribal courts are
presumed to have jurisdiction over matters arising on reservation lands, unless
Congress expressly and affirmatively takes such jurisdiction away." Because
the terms of section 2210 (n)(2) of Price-Anderson provide for concurrent state
jurisdiction, tribal courts should be read to have concurrent jurisdiction as well.
If Congress intended anything to the contrary, it would have expressly stated
so in the Act itself.
Civil tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian lands is presumed
unless Congress expressly takes it away. Neither the text nor the legislative
history of the Price-Anderson Act specifically address how the Act would
affect Indian tribes or tribal courts. The contention that tribal courts have no
jurisdiction because the Price-Anderson Act does not specifically delegate such
jurisdiction to tribal courts misapplies the rule in Iowa Mutual.
Congress does not have to delegate jurisdictional authority to tribal courts.
In fact, the opposite is true. The Supreme Court made this clear in Iowa
Mutual when it stated: "Tribal authority over the activities of non-Indians on
reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction
over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively
limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute."6 Similarly, the Tenth
Circuit stated with respect to non-Indians on reservation lands, that
"[j]urisdiction presumptively lies in the tribal court, therefore, unless Congress
has expressly limited that jurisdiction."'63
The only exceptions to the tribal court exhaustion doctrine can be found in
footnote 21 in the National Farmers case.' In National Farmers, the Supreme
Court stated it did "not suggest that exhaustion would be required . .. where
the action is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions";'
however, the Court insisted in the later opinion of Iowa Mutual that the
jurisdictional prohibition be express." Thus, when a federal statute fails to
address issues pertaining to tribal court jurisdiction, "the proper inference from
[congressional] silence ... is that the sovereign power ... remains intact."'
61. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
62. Id.
63. Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir. 1991).
64. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21
(1985).
65. Id.
66. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 18.
67. Id. (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14 (1982)).
No. 1]
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The removal provisions of the Price-Anderson Act does not guarantee a
right to a federal forum.' To the extent there is any guarantee, it is only that
a defendant in state court may remove the case to federal court. Nothing in
section 2210(n)(2) authorizes, much less guarantees, that actions in tribal court
may also be removed to federal court.
The Federal Circuit Court in the San Juan River Basin held actions in tribal
courts cannot be removed. In Becenti v. Vigil, ' the issue was whether 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which authorizes removal of cases involving actions
against officers of the United States, applied to actions initially filed in tribal
court." The Tenth Circuit held tribal court actions could not be removed
because 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (a)(1) did not expressly authorize removal of tribal
court actions.7' The United States contended the purpose of the removal
statute was to ensure that "a Federal officer or agent shall not be forced to
answer for conduct assertedly within his duties in any but a Federal forum."'
In rejecting the federal forum argument, the Tenth Circuit held "[t]he
question before us, however, is not whether Congress has the power to
authorize removal of actions commenced in tribal courts ... but rather whether
Congress has in fact done so. We must be careful not to expand the
jurisdiction of federal courts beyond Congressional mandates."'73 Hence, the
fact 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) did not expressly authorize removal from tribal
court was dispositive.
The reasoning of Becenti also applies to the Price-Anderson Act. If
Congress desired to guarantee a federal forum for all Price-Anderson-related
incidents, including those cases filed in tribal court, Congress would have
stated so expressly. It did not. Had Congress desired to confer exclusive
federal jurisdiction over Price-Anderson incidents, Congress would have said
so expressly. It did not. Accordingly, the Price-Anderson Act does not
guarantee a federal forum.
Summary
From the Native American sovereignty perspective, the Price-Anderson Act
does not contain an express prohibition of tribal court jurisdiction nor compel
68. See supra text accompanying note 20.
69. 902 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1990).
70. Ide
71. Id at 781.
72. Id at 779 (quoting North Carolina v. Carr, 386 F.2d 129, 131 (4th Cir. 1967)).
73. Id. at 780. However, it can be argued the Tenth Circuit never reached the second
jurisdictional issue of whether the tribal court could entertain a suit against a federal officer acting
within the scope of their governmental authority. When the same issue has been properly
presented through a direct federal action for injunction, the Ninth Circuit has twice held tribal
court exhaustion is unnecessary. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 784 F.2d 917,
920 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853, 861 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987); see also infra text accompanying note 97.
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exclusive federal jurisdiction. Thus, tribal court jurisdiction remains intact.
National Farmers, Iowa Mutual, and their progeny leave no choice: the
question of tribal court jurisdiction over nuclear incidents occurring within
Indian country must be decided initially by the tribal court itself.
Price-Anderson Perspective
The foregoing Native American sovereignty views of jurisdictional issues
in the case law context of the Price-Anderson Act could lead one to argue there
can be no "express jurisdictional prohibition" under National Farmers and Iowa
Mutual unless exclusive federal jurisdiction is explicitly reserved within the text
of the statute at issue.74 Predictably however, the law is not so crisp. Instead,
courts have recognized a jurisdictional prohibition may be made "express"
through (1) legislative history, (2) interpretive case law, or (3) contextual
interpretation of the statute itself. The jurisdictional prohibition contained
within 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) of Price-Anderson can be independently
demonstrated through each of these means. The resulting conclusion from these
interpretations is that tribal courts may not have jurisdiction over nuclear
incidents that occur on their territory under the Price-Anderson Act.
Legislative History
The United States Supreme Court relied on legislative history to determine
whether there were jurisdictional prohibitions in the very cases that established
the tribal court exhaustion doctrine. In Iowa Mutual, the Supreme Court held
tribal courts had jurisdiction over diversity cases based upon the legislative
history of 28 U.S.C. § 1332:
The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, makes no reference to
Indians and nothing in the legislative history suggests any intent to
render inoperative the established federal policy promoting tribal
self-government. Tribal courts in the Anglo-American mold were
virtually unknown in 1789 when Congress first authorized diversity
jurisdiction, see Judiciary Act of 1789, § 11, 1 Stat. 78-79; and the
original statute did not manifest a congressional intent to limit
tribal sovereignty."
Similarly, in National Farmers, the Supreme Court inferred a legislative intent
to allow tribal courts federal question jurisdiction over non-Indians by
comparing the absence of federal legislation governing such civil suits with
preemptive legislation that gives federal courts jurisdiction over non-Indians
charged with crimes in Indian country.76 Although there are federal statutes
punishing crimes by non-Indians on the reservation, the court noted that "there
74. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994); see also supra text accompanying note 28.
75. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 17 (1987).
76. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 854.
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is no comparable legislation granting the federal courts jurisdiction over civil
disputes between Indians and non-Indians that arise on an Indian
reservation."' Accordingly, the Court found a lack of a congressional intent
to create the same exclusive federal jurisdiction over non-Indians in civil cases
as it had for reservation criminal cases through the Major Crimes Act."
Uniformly, the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) demonstrates
a clear congressional intent that any defendant, or the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission itself, has an absolute right to have Price-Anderson case in federal
court has been true from the beginning of Price-Anderson. When section
2210(n)(2) was first enacted in 1966, Price-Anderson covered only
Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrences (ENOs); then the statute was written so
all claims arising from the same ENO could be consolidated before a single
federal court.
New Section 170(n)(2) [42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2)] establishes the
applicable venue and jurisdiction for public liability actions arising
out of or resulting from an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence."
An action may be instituted in a State court or another U.S.
district court, and, indeed, may be permitted to continue in such
court if the circumstances of the occurrence and the action do not
appear to the defendant or the Commission to necessitate removal.
However, the absolute right of removal or transfer by the
defendant or the Commission to the U.S. district court having
venue under subsection 170(n)(2) [42 U.S.C. § 2210 (n)(2)] would
be assured.'s
The consequences of limiting Price-Anderson claims to ENOs became apparent
when over three thousand claims arising from the Three Mile Island accident
were filed in different state and federal courts.
The Three Mile Island nuclear accidente1 was the primary impetus for the
1988 revisions of section 2210(n)(2) of the Price-Anderson Act. Over three
thousand claims were filed as a result of the Three Mile Island incident,
however bqcause of the 1966 ENO limitation in section 2210(n)(2), the Third
.77. Id.
78. Id. at 854-55. The Major Crimes Act provides that Indians committing any of the
enumerated offenses "shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons
committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." 18
U.S.C. § 1153 (1994). Courts of appeals have read this language to exclude tribal jurisdiction
over the Indian offender. See, e.g., Felicia v. United States, 495 F.2d 353, 354 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 849 (1974); Sam v. United States, 385 F.2d 213, 214 (10th Cir. 1967).
79. See supra note 15.
80. S. REP. No. 89-1605, at 645, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3228 (emphasis added),
81. The accident was not designated as an ENO by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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Circuit in Stibitz v. General Public Utilities Corp.' held there was no basis
under Price-Anderson to remove the various multiparty Three Mile Island state
cases to a single federal court.' Accordingly, all of the cases, which initially
had been removed to federal district court, were returned to the various state
courts in which they had been filed.'
The 1988 Amendments to the Price-Anderson Act addressed this problem
by: (1) expanding Price-Anderson to include all nuclear-related torts ("nuclear
incidents"); (2) reaffirming the absolute right of defendants or the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to have all related cases consolidated before a single
federal district court; and (3) making the changes retroactive so Stibitz cases
could become consolidated in TMI HJ.'
The need for these changes was the subject of congressional testimony by
lawyers representing both sides of the Three Mile Island controversy. John
Harkins, an attorney representing multiple TMI 11 defendants, addressed the
Stibitz decision:
The effect of [the Third Circuit Court's decision in Stibitz] was
to send the [TMI] litigation, in effect, back to the State court
systems and, as it has gradually evolved, into other State court
systems, and other Federal courts as well. .. . Jurisdiction is,
therefore, a key question in terms of transactional efficiency.'
The Price-Anderson Act had worked well, with the exception of this
jurisdictional issue. The problem that arose from varying jurisdictions handling
a nonserious nuclear accident, like TMI, was that it could spawn thousands of
claims in hundreds of different jurisdictions. Consequently, the cost to
determine the appropriate level of compensation in each jurisdiction becomes
extraordinarily high. This would be true unless some means was provided to
consolidate the litigation in one federal court. David Berger, an attorney for
multiple TMI I1 plaintiffs, addressed the need for consolidation in terms of
judicial economy: "[W]e should have a minimizing of transactional costs.
Instead of having thousand of cases brought all over the fifty states and six
territories ... there would be one court, one case to resolve the matter.""7
In the Nuclear Regulation Hearing itself, specific questions regarding
compensation for claimants and federal jurisdiction were asked by the presiding
senators. The responses to these questions are persuasive in demonstrating that
82. 746 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).
83. Id. at 997.
84. Id.
85. In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 854-55, 861 (3d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 906 (1992) (TM 11); see supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
86. Reauthorization of the Price-Anderson Act, May 13, 1986: Hearings on S. 445, S. 1225,
and S. 1761 Before the SubcomnL on Nuclear Regulation on the Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works,
99th Cong. 4 (1986) [hereinafter Nuclear Regulation Hearing].
87. Id. at 13.
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it was the legislature's intent to create "exclusive" federal jurisdiction for claims
falling under the Price-Anderson Act. Each of the witnesses at the hearing
answered that they favored exclusive federal jurisdiction in a single court in
order to expedite and handle compensation issues. The following is a brief
excerpt of the Nuclear Regulation Hearing:
Senator Simpson: If you could... [I would like you to] expand
on what impact the presence of multiple defendants has on the
prosecution of a case, or proceeding with a case, comment
specifically on how litigation affects the ability of claimants to
recover.... I
Berger (response in part): I think that if you had a single court,
a Federal court, and it must be a Federal court, with the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine the cases arising out of a
nuclear incident, that... the court would be ordered to handle the
question of compensation for victims, and that can be taken care
of very swiftly...
Senator Mitchell addressed the same issue of federal jurisdiction immediately
following Senator Simpson's questions:
Senator Mitchell: What about a single federal court with
exclusive jurisdiction?
Mr. Harkins: Yes, absolutely, Senator, I believe that is highly
necessary. We had it until the Third Circuit ruled there wasn't
Federal question jurisdiction [in Stibitz]. We had it and we had the
efficiencies that go with it. I think that we should get it back
legislatively.
Senator Mitchell: It would be better for the defendants as well
as the plaintiffs wouldn't it?
Mr. Harkins: For both sides, absolutely. It makes all of the
advantages for the system, and it doesn't give any unusual
advantage to either party.
Mr. Kennedy (of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission): I would
subscribe to what Mr. Harkins has said. We, long ago concluded
in other connections that in the mass case, the right solution is
exclusive Federal jurisdiction in a single Federal court.89
Additional support for consolidation of nuclear claims in a single federal
court can be found from statements by Senator McClure, the ranking minority
member in the State Energy Committee at the time, who read a statement by
one of the witnesses of the same Nuclear Regulation Hearing into the
Congressional Record during debates on the Price-Anderson Amendments Act.
88. Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).
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Kenneth Feinberg, an attorney for multiple plaintiffs in asbestos litigation and
former staff member of the Judiciary Committee, stated:
To avoid confusion, inconsistency, and duplicative litigation in
large-scale accidents, the [Price-Anderson] Act requires that all
victims' claims be consolidated and tried in a single federal court.
This sharply contrasts with the experience in the asbestos
litigations, in which tens of thousands of lawsuits have been
scattered throughout the state and federal courts across the United
States. As a consequence, the asbestos litigations have defied
coherent resolution, and have fostered unfair and disparate
judgments and settlements at great expense to all parties, and only
after considerable delay. In addition to conserving funds for
victims that would otherwise go to legal fees, consolidated claims
in one court helps assure that victims with similar injuries are
treated alike °
Senate Bill 1865 comprised the recommended 1988 amendments to the
Price-Anderson Act.9' After hearing recommendations in the Nuclear
Regulation Hearing, the Environment and Public Works Committee wrote
Senate Report 218, recommending that Senate Bill 1865 be passed and setting
forth its recommendations. These recommendations and much of the Senate
bills' text were then incorporated into House Bill 1414.' This bill was
subsequently passed by both houses of the Congress and signed into law by the
President 3 There was no conference report generated.
Senate Report 218 specifically discusses: (1) the problem created by Stibitz
as addressed in the Nuclear Regulation Hearing; (2) the testimony of the
attorneys representing both plaintiffs and defendants in the TMI litigation from
the Nuclear Regulation Hearing; and (3) the need to make it possible to
consolidate all claims arising out of any nuclear incident in a single federal
district court as discussed in the Nuclear Regulation Hearing.
While Committee hearings are technically not part of a legislative history
because they do not contain congressional deliberations, the adaptation of
language from those hearings into the Senate Report is persuasive as to why
Congress enacted the Price-Anderson Amendments Acts of 1988. Senate
Report 218 says:
90. 134 CONG. REc. S2301, S2322-23 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1988) (statement of Sen. McClure)
(emphasis added).
91. S. 1865, 100th Cong. (1987). Senate Bill 748 also contained some recommendations for
Price-Anderson amendments. S. 748, 100th Cong. (1987).
92. H.R. 1414, 100th Cong. (1987). Congress passed the Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994)).
93. See supra note 92.
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Under current law, only claims arising from an ENO may be
consolidated in federal court. In litigation following the Three Mile
Island accident, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction for
claims arising out of a non-ENO nuclear incident. Stibitz v. GPU,
746 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1187 (1985).
Te bill expands existing law to allow for the consolidation of
claims arising out of any nuclear incident in federal district court.
The experience with claims following the TMI accident
demonstrates the advantages of the ability to consolidate claims
after the nuclear incident. Attorneys representing both plaintiffs
and defendants in the TMI-litigation testified before the Committee
that the ability to consolidate claims in federal court would greatly
benefit the process for determining compensation for claimants.
The TMI accident, which was not an ENO, has resulted in over
150 separate cases against TMI defendants, with over 3,000
claimants, in various state and Federal courts. Many of the issues
in these cases are similar. The availability of the provisions for
consolidation of claims in the event of any nuclear incident, not
just an ENO, would avoid the inefficiencies resulting from
duplicative determinations of similar issues in multiple jurisdictions
that may occur in the absence of consolidation.
Accordingly, the bill provides the federal district court in which
the nuclear incident occurred [with] subject matter jurisdiction over
claims arising from the nuclear incident. Any suit asserting public
liability shall be deemed to be an action arising under the Price-
Anderson Act, and the substantive law of decision shall be derived
from the law of the State in which the incident occurred, in order
to satisfy the Article III requirement that federal courts have
jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution or under the
laws of the United States. 4
Based on the language within the Senate Report, which appears to be adopted
directly from the Nuclear Regulation Hearing, the 1988 amendments to the
Price-Anderson Act are designed to prevent multiple, separate, nuclear tort
claims from taking place in various tribal and state courts by uranium mill
workers, neighbors, and members of families - regardless of whether the tort
was committed on Indian country or not.
The legislative history of the 1988 Price-Anderson Amendments Act
demonstrates a congressional intent that every defendant facing liability under
the Act has an absolute right to have its case heard in federal court. Everything
from congressional hearings to congressional floor debate to Senate Reports
94. S. REP. No. 100-218, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1488 (emphasis added).
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state the Amendments Act was to provide an exclusive federal forum for Price-
Anderson defendants. Providing tribal courts with concurrent jurisdiction over
nuclear incidents would defeat this congressional purpose.
Case Law
Express tribal court jurisdictional prohibitions are also created by case law.
In United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe" and United States v.
Yakima Tribal Court," the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found tribal court
exhaustion was unnecessary to enjoin tribal court actions brought against
government officials because tribal court jurisdiction was precluded by the
judicially recognized doctrine of sovereign immunity.'
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe8 is even more instructive when
considering jurisdictional prohibitions. In Oliphant, the Supreme Court
"concluded that federal legislation conferring jurisdiction on the federal courts
to try non-Indians for offenses committed in Indian Country had implicitly pre-
empted tribal jurisdiction."' The important point taken from Oliphant is there
is no "express" statutory jurisdictional prohibition which precludes non-Indians
from being tried for crimes in tribal court. Yet by finding an implicit federal
preemption and making it explicit through its decision in Oliphant, the United
States Supreme Court created an "express jurisdictional prohibition." No one
can doubt if, in disregard of Oliphant, a non-Indian were criminally charged
in tribal court today, he would be entitled to have his prosecution enjoined by
a federal court without the necessity of tribal exhaustion."°
And so it is with the Price-Anderson Act. In Oliphant, the Supreme Court
announced a rule. of law based upon its judicial determination that Congress
intended to take away criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians from Indian tribes.
Similarly, TMI 11 and O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co.' have
judicially announced that section 2210(n)(2) of Price-Anderson must be
interpreted so all cases from a nuclear incident can be consolidated before a
single federal district court. Consequently, like Oliphant, the courts have
created an "express federal preemption" against hearing Price-Anderson claims
in tribal court.
95. 784 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1986).
96. 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987).
97. See White Mountain Apache Tribe, 784 F.2d at 920; Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d at
861.
98. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
99. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 853-54
(1985); see Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204.
100. See, e.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 784 F.2d 917 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Yakima Tribal Court, 806 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069
(1987); see supra text accompanying note 97.
101. 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994).
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The reasoning processes of Oliphant, TMIII, and O'Connor are similar. The
Oliphant court relies heavily on Senate Report 1686 in finding its jurisdictional
prohibition."° Similarly, TMI H and O'Connor discuss Senate Report 218 in
rendering their decisions." The Third Circuit in TMI II explains:
[The [1988 Amendments to the Price-Anderson Act] included
an expansion of the reach of section 2210(n)(2) to provide for
removal of, and original federal jurisdiction over, claims arising
from any "nuclear incident."''
The [1988 Amendments to the Price-Anderson Act] ensures that
every claim originating in a single nuclear incident may be
considered with other similar claims. Where, as here, an incident
results in multiple claims with cases filed in several counties in
several states, consolidation in federal court serves to reduce
uncertainty, expenditure of resources in dealing with duplicative
issues, and the possibility of inconsistent outcomes.015
O'Connor makes the same consolidation point expressly:
The [1988 Amendments to the Price-Anderson Act] create[] a
federal cause of action which did not exist prior to the Act,
establishes federal jurisdiction for that cause of action, and
channels all legal liability to the federal courts through that cause
of action. By creating this federal program which requires the
application of federal law, Congress sought to effect uniformity,
equity, and efficiency in the disposition of public liability claims.
With the federal jurisdiction and removal provisions set forth in
the [1988] Amendments Act, Congress ensured that all claims
resulting from a given nuclear incident would be governed by the
same law, provided for the coordination of all phases of litigation
and the orderly distribution of funds. .. .
In the face of these express judicial pronouncements, it is difficult to
maintain that Congress intended consolidation under Price-Anderson to be
thwarted by lawsuits filed in tribal courts. If an express jurisdictional
prohibition against tribal courts did not exist before the 1988 Amendments to
Price-Anderson, the amended statute, supported by Third Circuit opinion in
102. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204-06 (discussing S. REP. No. 86-1686, at 2-3 (1960)).
103. In re TMI Litig. Cases Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 844 n.8 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 906 (1992) (TMI I1) (discussing S. REP. No. 100-218, at 13); O'Connor, 13 F.3d at
1102 (same).
104. TM! II, 940 F.2d at 853.
105. Id. at 861.
106. O'Connor, 13 F.3d at 1101 (emphasis added).
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TMI II and the Seventh Circuit opinion in O'Connor, may create a tribal court
jurisdictional prohibition today.
Statutory Interpretation
The Native American sovereignty perspective which holds all express
jurisdictional prohibitions must say federal jurisdiction is "exclusive" or "tribal
court jurisdiction is precluded" within the statute itself is an unreasonable
interpretation of statutory construction in the jurisdictional area of the law. As
we have already seen in Oliphant, the law is not so uniformly literal.
For example, in 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a), which governs jurisdiction of lawsuits
brought against the United States, the statute says "district courts shall have
original jurisdiction" and also acknowledges the existence of "concurrent
[jurisdiction] with the United States Court of Federal Claims."'" The
language is equivalent to that found in section 2210(n)(2) of the Price-
Anderson Act. '
With respect to concurrent jurisdiction, the Price-Anderson Act is confined
to state courts with an absolute right of removal."° For section 1346(a)
concurrent jurisdiction is vested in the United States Court of Federal Claims.
Even though 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a), like section 2210(n)(2) of Price-Anderson,
does not explicitly restrict jurisdiction to federal district courts and federal court
of claims, it has been universally interpreted as excluding jurisdiction by other
courts."' Moreover, courts generally recognize when a statute commits
review of a specific class of claims to a certain court, like the federal district
court in Price-Anderson, the jurisdiction of that court over the claims is
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1994).
108. See supra text accompanying note 20.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (1994).
110. See 13 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3527
n.12 (2d ed. 1984) (stating that in 28 U.S.C. §1346(a) "it is only by implication that federal
jurisdiction is exclusive").
Other examples abound of jurisdictional prohibition without there being express statutory
language contained within the statute. For example, 15 U.S.C. § 15 says nothing about exclusive
jurisdiction, but it is well settled that federal courts enjoy "exclusive jurisdiction over federal anti-
trust actions." Englehart v. Bell & Howell Co., 327 F.2d 30, 35 (8th Cir. 1964). Similarly, in
Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436 (1920), the
Supreme Court considered the meaning of section 7 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which
"created a cause of action in favor of any person to recover by suit in any District Court of the
United States." Id. at 440. Moreover, in General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michigan
Southern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 261 (1922), the Court considered the meaning of section 16 of
the Clayton Act, which states that "any person ... shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive
relief, in any court of the United States having jurisdiction over the parties." Id. at 287; see 15
U.S.C. § 26 (1994). The Court found the right to sue granted by the Act is stated in "terms which
show that it is to be exercised only in a 'court of the United States."' General Investment, 260
U.S. at 287.
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exclusive."' This is true even in the absence of an express statutory
command of exclusiveness."'
Similarly, in Possessky v. National Flood Insurers Ass'n,"' which
considered an early version of the National Flood Insurance Program,"' the
court held the mere grant of "original jurisdiction" to the federal district courts
under the National Flood Insurance Act divested state courts of concurrent
jurisdiction over suits brought against the government under the Act.'" The
court reasoned exclusive federal jurisdiction is appropriate when a statute
authorizes suits to be brought against the government."'
The exclusive jurisdiction afforded under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) and the
reasoning process by the court in Possessky further buttress the argument
against tribal court jurisdiction over Price-Anderson claims. Under the
indemnification plans built into Price-Anderson, the federal government is often
the ultimate financially responsible party in a Price-Anderson action."7 This
is why the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has an absolute right of removal
under the Act."' On major liabilities, the federal government requires it have
the option of having its own financial responsibility decided by a federal
court."9
In Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs,'t ' the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals considered a claim that Indian reservation garbage
dumps violated the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
(RCRA).'' Tribal court exhaustion was one of the issues raised on appeal.
The Tribe argued respect for tribal self-government required the suit initially
I 11. Public Util. Commr of Or. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 767 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1985).
112. Id. at 627; see also Pleasant Broad. Co. v. FCC, 564 F.2d 496, 500-01 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
("[E]ven where Congress has not expressly conferred exclusive jurisdiction, a special review
statute vesting jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off other courts' original jurisdiction in all
cases covered by the special statute.").
113. 507 F. Supp. 913 (D.N.J. 1981).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 4072 (1994).
115. Possessky, 507 F. Supp. at 915.
*116. Id,
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d)(e)(2-3) (1994).
118. See id. § 2210(n)(2).
119. In a few instances, Congress has made explicit its intent to provide state court
jurisdiction over claims that would otherwise fall within the exclusive federal jurisdiction of 28
U.S.C. § 1346. For example, the MeCarren Amendment gives state courts conditional jurisdiction
to adjudicate federal water rights. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1994). These separate statutes provide further
support for the proposition, but for express delegation of state court jurisdiction by Congress, the
federal government consents to be sued only in federal courts. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 364(b)(1)
(1994); see also Mar v. Cleppe, 520 F.2d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1975) ("It could hardly have been
intended by Congress that suits... against the [Small Business] Administrator could be brought
in any state court of general jurisdiction, but in the federal jurisdiction only in the Court of
Claims ...." (quoting Ferguson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 126 F.2d 753, 756 (4th Cir. 1942))),
120. 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989).
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-3259 (1994).
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be brought in tribal court.'" While the court acknowledged the tribal court
exhaustion rule as set out in National Farmers and Iowa Mutual, the Eighth
Circuit determined exhaustion was not required because RCRA gave federal
courts exclusive juris'diction." It held there was exclusive federal jurisdiction
even though there is no mention of exclusivd jurisdiction in the statute: "Any
action under paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection [as this case is] shall be
brought in the district court for the district in which the alleged violation
occurred . . . ."4 The finding of exclusive jurisdiction in Blue Legs flatly
refutes any contention that tribal court jurisdiction exists unless explicitly
excluded by statute.
Statutory interpretation of the Price-Anderson Act also demonstrates the
government wanted to preempt the field of nuclear energy. Due to our nation's
vital interest in nuclear energy, "the Federal Government has occupied the
entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly
ceded to the States."" "When the Federal Government completely occupies
a given field or an identifiable portion of it, as it has done [with nuclear
safety], the test of pre-emption is whether 'the matter on which the State asserts
the right to act is in any way regulated by the Federal Act.""' As a
consequence, it necessarily follows the only jurisdiction allowed under section
2210(n)(2) of Price-Anderson is that ceded to any "state court" subject to an
absolute right of removal which can be exercised by the defendant to a nuclear
claim or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.'"
Moreover, private industry has been understandably reluctant to respond
enthusiastically to the government's call for nuclear contractors. Given the
staggering potential liabilities that can result from a nuclear accident, Price-
Anderson was enacted partially as a result of "spokesmen for the private
[nuclear] sector inform[ing] Congress that they would be forced to withdraw
from the field if their liability were not limited by appropriate legislation."' "
Thus one of the announced purposes of Price-Anderson was "to protect the
122. Blue Legs, 867 F.2d at 1097.
123. Id. at 1098.
124. Id. Compare id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1994)) with 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2)
(1994) ("With respect to any public liability action arising out of ... a nuclear incident, the
United States district court in the district where the nuclear incident takes place... shall have
original jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship of any party or the amount in controversy.").
125. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conversation & Dev. Comm., 461
U.S. 190, 212 (1983) (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 212-13 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947)).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (1994).
128. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 64 (1978) (citing
Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy on Gov't Indemnity for Private Licensees and
AEC Contractors Against Reactor Hazards, 84th Cong. 9, 109-10, 115, 120, 136-37, 148, 181,
195, 240 (1956)); see also O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090, 1095 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994) (quoting Duke Power Co.).
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public and ... encourage the development of the atomic energy industry.11aI
Furthermore, the "Price-Anderson System" is a package which includes
omnibus coverage and provisions to simplify litigation, and "also provides a
mechanism whereby the federal government can continue to encourage private
sector participation in the beneficial uses of nuclear materials."'' 3 The ability
to simplify and limit the transaction costs of litigation through the 1988
Amendments to section 2210 of the Price-Anderson Act is a vital part of this
"System": "Thus, the [1988] Amendments Act is the latest installment in nearly
fifty years of congressional work. During that time, Congress has attempted to
encourage the development of domestic nuclear power to the fullest extent
through licensing, indemnification, limitation of liability, and consolidation of
litigation."'' As demonstrated by the legislative history of the 1988
Amendments, reducing the cost of nuclear incident litigation by providing for
consolidation in a single federal district court is an essential part of the atomic
energy regulatory function achieved through Price-Anderson's federal
preemption. Statutory interpretation of the Price-Anderson Act leads to the
conclusion that tribal court jurisdiction was designed to be preempted by the
Act.
Sumnnary
The 1988 Price-Anderson Amendments were enacted to serve the interests
of judicial economy. Consequently, actions growing from operations of
uranium mills in Indian country are compelled to federal courts. No purpose
is served by forcing plaintiffs or defendants of nuclear incidents to exhaust
their jurisdictional arguments in a multitude of different tribal courts. As a
result of complete federal preemption in the area of nuclear safety, there is an
express jurisdictional prohibition against Price-Anderson actions in any court
but the United States federal district court for the district in which the event
occurred or in state court with an absolute right of removal and transfer to that
federal venue.
Future Implications
Who has jurisdiction in nuclear incidents that take place in Indian country?
The simple answer, when one only looks at a few courts holdings, is that the
tribal court maintains jurisdiction. Both the National Farmers and Iowa Mutual
decisions appear to support the conclusion that tribal courts are'presumed to
have jurisdiction for injuries to Indians occurring on Indian reservations.
Moreover, the language of Price-Anderson does not explicitly assert a
jurisdictional prohibition against tribal courts, nor does the Act assert tribal
129. O'Connor, 13 F.3d at 1095 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2012 (1994)).
130. Id. at 1095-96; see also supra text accompanying note 18.
131. O'Connor, 13 F.3d at 1096 (emphasis added).
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courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction over nuclear-related actions. From
a cursory analysis, courts and attorneys would probably claim Price-Anderson
does not preempt tribal jurisdiction. However, one cannot ignore all of the
subtleties of the tribal exhaustion cases and the Price-Anderson Act.
Once the tribal court exhaustion doctrine and the Price-Anderson Act are
looked at in their entirety, the congressional desire to recognize tribal courts
jurisdiction under all but express circumstances becomes extremely unclear.
Each of the tribal court exhaustion cases have left themselves open to
interpretation. There are subtle inferences contained within the exhaustion
doctrine opinions which could lead the legal community to believe "express"
language within a statute is not necessary to overcome tribal exhaustion if the
congressional intent to prohibit such jurisdiction is clear from the legislative
history of the statute. The legislative intent of the Amendments to the Price-
Anderson Act and historical statutory interpretation of similar statutes make it
appear Congress is not always as "express" in its prohibition against tribal
courts jurisdiction as judges and attorneys would like.
The Federal Government has the ability to take away tribal court jurisdiction
over Price-Anderson claims if it desires to do so. The legislative history, case
law and statutory interpretation of the Price-Anderson Act may point to such
a motive, but the language to preclude tribal jurisdiction is far from crystal
clear. Consequently, to take away the tribal court's ability to be the first to
determine if it wants jurisdiction over nuclear-related incidents taking place on
its territory would be patently violative of the tribal court exhaustion doctrine
which requires an express statement by Congress to preclude such
jurisdiction."' Moreover, courts have consistently held tribal sovereign
powers remain intact when a federal statute, like Price-Anderson, fails to
address issues pertaining to tribal court jurisdiction.'
It is important to note, however, that tribal court exhaustion does not mean
the tribal court will or should accept jurisdiction over Price-Anderson claims.
The legislative history of the 1988 amendments to Price-Anderson and prior
case law affirmatively state Congress' desire to consolidate all nuclear-related
incidents in a single forum to avoid confusion, inconsistency, and the
duplicative litigation experienced in the TMI litigation." Thus, if a tribal
court does decide to accept jurisdiction over a Price-Anderson claim it is
arguably assuming the responsibility to adjudicate all claims arising from the
respective nuclear incident irrespective of where those claimants come
from.'
35
132. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
133. ld.; see also Merrion, supra note 40, at 149 n.14.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 85-90.
135. The Three Mile Island incident resulted in over 150 individual cases with 3000
claimants. S. REP. No. 100-218, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1477.
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While a tribal court is as competent to interpret federal law and the Price-
Anderson Act as a state or federal court, it is this author's belief that a wise
tribal court would refuse jurisdiction over Price-Anderson claims. Tribal courts
probably would not want to get involved in the atomic energy regulatory
function as delineated in Price-Anderson or the other complexities inherent in
the atomic industry and associated litigation. In declining jurisdiction, a tribal
court's tribal member will still have the same statutory protection under Price-
Anderson in a federal court as it would in tribal court and the members of their
respective tribes will benefit in the ability to simplify and limit the transaction
costs of litigation by consolidating their cases with other claimants in a single
federal forum and by ensuring consistent outcomes with nontribal litigants.
Moreover, in the event, a tribal court were to accept jurisdiction over a
Price-Anderson claim, litigants from multiple states and other Native American
tribes could conceivably end up in this single local tribal court.'36 Acceptance
could create problems in some cases where one tribal court does not have
jurisdiction over other claimants being consolidated within the court. For
example, a tribal court from one tribe within San Juan River Basin may not
have jurisdiction over members from another tribe within the same river
basin. 37 Similarly, not all tribal courts have addressed the issue of whether
they would have jurisdiction over claimants for an incident taking place outside
their respective reservation boundaries.' Each of these problems could be
avoided if the tribal court declines jurisdiction over the Price-Anderson claim
in favor of jurisdiction in a single federal district court.
Since a tribal court has not accepted jurisdiction over a Price-Anderson-
related incident, there is no right or wrong answer today. However, with
potentially thousands of claims in the future, the jurisdiction issue is ripe for
Congress to address. It would be very easy for Congress to add a single line
to section 2210(n)(2) of Price-Anderson claiming to "preclude tribal
jurisdiction" and resolve all of the conflicts described above. However, until
the time when a tribal court accepts jurisdiction over a Price-Anderson case,
one should not expect Congress to modify the Act.
136. For example, the Laguna Pueblo, Acoma Pueblo, Canoncito Pueblo, and Isleta Pueblo
all share common reservation borders and are all within a fifty mile radius of the same major
uranium production facility. See also supra note 2 and text accompanying notes 2-3.
137. For example, the Isleta Pueblo Tribal Court does not have jurisdiction over members
of the Canoncito Pueblo. Similarly, the Acoma Pueblo Tribal Court does not have jurisdiction
over members of the Laguna Pueblo. In each of these circumstances, the litigants seeking
recompense must bring their claim in their own tribal court. Telephone Interviews with Isleta
Pueblo and Acoma Pueblo Tribal Counsel (Jan. 3, 1996).
138. For example, the Isleta Pueblo has not considered jurisdictional issues concerning
litigants outside the reservation boundary. "Jurisdictional issues are generally limited to incidents
occurring on the reservation land but are subject to change at the court's discretion." Telephone
Interview with Isleta Pueblo Tribal Counsel (Jan. 3, 1996).
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Price-Anderson is subject to review in the year 2002.2"9 In the event a
tribal court accepts jurisdiction over a Price-Anderson-related incident before
this time, Congress would likely resolve the problem with an immediate
amendment to the Act as it did after the Third Circuit court's decision in
Stibitz.'" Given the history of nuclear-related claims in the Three Mile Island
incident and the problems of having the government be financially responsible
for multiple claims in multiple jurisdictions,"" Congress would likely create
a clear "express prohibition" against tribal court jurisdiction.
Only Congress knows what it intended when writing the 1988 Amendments
to the Price-Anderson Act. Until Congress clarifies Price-Anderson
jurisdictional issues, the tribal exhaustion doctrine will continue to live in the
penumbra of the Price-Anderson Act and lawyers and judges will only be left
with conjecture about which court or courts have proper jurisdiction over
nuclear-related injuries occurring on Indian reservations.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(d) (1994).
140. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
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